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1729 
ESSAYS 
THE PEOPLE OR THE STATE?: CHISHOLM V. GEORGIA 
AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 
Randy E. Barnett* 
HISHOLM v. Georgia was the first great constitutional case de-
cided by the Supreme Court. In Chisholm, the Court addressed a 
fundamental question: Who is sovereign? The people or the state? It 
adopted an individual concept of popular sovereignty rather than the 
modern view that limits popular sovereignty to collective or democratic 
self-government. It denied that the State of Georgia was a sovereign en-
titled, like the King of England, to assert immunity from a lawsuit 
brought by a private citizen. Despite all this, Chisholm is not among the 
canon of cases that all law students are taught. Why not? In this Essay, I 
offer several reasons: constitutional law is taught by doctrine rather 
than chronologically; law professors have reason to privilege the Mar-
shall Court; and the Court’s individualist view of popular sovereignty is 
thought to have been repudiated by the adoption of the Eleventh 
Amendment. I explain why the Eleventh Amendment did not repudiate 
the view of sovereignty expressed in Chisholm by comparing the word-
ing of the Eleventh with that of the Ninth Amendment. I conclude by 
suggesting another reason why Chisholm is not in the canon: law pro-
fessors follow the lead of the Supreme Court, and, like the Ninth 
Amendment, the Supreme Court has deemed its first great decision too 
radical in its implications. 
INTRODUCTION 
Constitutional law professors know two things that their students 
often do not: John Marshall was not the first Chief Justice of the 
 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Legal Theory, Georgetown University Law 
Center. This paper was prepared to be delivered as the inaugural lecture of the Car-
mack Waterhouse Professorship in Legal Theory at Georgetown University Law Cen-
ter and the John E. Sullivan Lecture at Capital Law School in Columbus, Ohio. 
C 
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United States, and Marbury v. Madison1 was not the first great con-
stitutional case decided by the Supreme Court. That honor goes to 
Chisholm v. Georgia,2 decided some ten years earlier when John 
Jay was Chief Justice. Students may be unaware of these facts be-
cause most basic courses in constitutional law begin with Marbury, 
which, along with Chief Justice Marshall’s opinions in McCulloch 
v. Maryland3 and Gibbons v. Ogden,4 are the earliest cases that are 
emphasized. The opinions in Chisholm are never read; at most, the 
case is mentioned in passing to explain the origin of the Eleventh 
Amendment, which reversed its holding.  
In Chisholm, the Supreme Court, by a vote of four to one, re-
jected Georgia’s assertion of sovereign immunity as a defense 
against a suit in federal court for breach of contract brought against 
it by a citizen of another state. The fundamental nature of the issue 
presented by the case was aptly characterized by Justice Wilson: 
This is a case of uncommon magnitude. One of the parties to it is 
a State; certainly respectable, claiming to be sovereign. The ques-
tion to be determined is, whether this State, so respectable, and 
whose claim soars so high, is amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court of the United States? This question, important in 
itself, will depend on others, more important still; and, may, per-
haps, be ultimately resolved into one, no less radical than this—
“do the people of the United States form a Nation?”5 
In Chisholm, the Justices of the Supreme Court rejected Geor-
gia’s claim to be sovereign. They concluded instead that, to the ex-
tent the term “sovereignty” is even appropriately applied to the 
newly adopted Constitution, sovereignty rests with the people, 
rather than with state governments. Their decision is inconsistent 
with both the modern concept of popular sovereignty that views 
democratically elected legislatures as exercising the sovereign will 
of the people and the modern claim that states are entitled to the 
same immunity as was enjoyed by the King of England. The Jus-
tices in Chisholm affirmed that, in America, the states are not 
 
1 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
2 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
3 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
4 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). 
5 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 453 (Wilson, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
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kings, and their legislatures are not the supreme successors to the 
Crown. 
I. WHY WE SHOULD TEACH CHISHOLM 
The judicial opinions in Chisholm are interesting for several rea-
sons. First, the opinions exemplify the early reliance by the courts 
primarily on first principles, or what Justice Wilson referred to as 
“general principles of right,”6 and only secondarily on the text of 
the Constitution. Chisholm is typical in this regard. This is not to 
claim that courts ever countenanced using first principles to ignore 
or contradict a pertinent text. Rather, Chisholm well illustrates 
how first principles were used to interpret the meaning of the text, 
such as Article III, Section 2, which specifies that  “[t]he judicial 
power of the United States shall extend to . . . controversies, be-
tween a state and citizens of another State.”7 
In Chisholm, Georgia contended that this text needed to be 
qualified by the extratextual doctrine of sovereign immunity. The 
Court did not reject Georgia’s claim due to its reliance on first 
principles. Instead, it rejected the first principles Georgia asserted 
in favor of others. Justice Wilson began his analysis of Georgia’s 
claim of sovereign immunity by contesting the appropriateness of 
the very term “sovereignty” with regard to the new Constitution: 
To the Constitution of the United States the term Sovereign, is 
totally unknown. There is but one place where it could have been 
used with propriety. But, even in that place it would not, perhaps, 
have comported with the delicacy of those, who ordained and es-
tablished that Constitution. They might have announced them-
selves “Sovereign” people of the United States: But serenely 
conscious of the fact, they avoided the ostentatious declaration.8 
Wilson then identified possible alternative meanings of the term 
“sovereign.” First, “the term sovereign has for its correlative, sub-
ject[.] In this sense, the term can receive no application; for it has 
no object in the Constitution of the United States. Under that Con-
 
6 Id. at 456. 
7 U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. 
8 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 454 (emphasis omitted). 
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stitution there are citizens, but no subjects.”9 Indeed, Wilson noted 
that the “term, subject, occurs . . . once in the instrument; but to 
mark the contrast strongly, the epithet ‘foreign’ is prefixed.”10 Wil-
son rejected the concept of “subject” as inapplicable to states be-
cause he knew “the Government of that State to be republican; 
and my short definition of such a Government is,—one constructed 
on this principle, that the Supreme Power resides in the body of the 
people.”11 Furthermore, Wilson argued that 
the citizens of Georgia, when they acted upon the large scale of 
the Union, as a part of the “People of the United States,” did not 
surrender the Supreme or sovereign Power to that State; but, as 
to the purposes of the Union, retained it to themselves. As to the 
purposes of the Union, therefore, Georgia is NOT a sovereign 
State.12 
In other words, according to Justice Wilson, to the extent one 
wishes to use the word “sovereignty” at all, sovereignty lies in the 
people themselves, not in any government formed by the people. 
Wilson then considered another sense of sovereignty that relates 
it to the feudal power of English kings. “Into England this system 
was introduced by the conqueror: and to this æra we may, proba-
bly, refer the English maxim, that the King or sovereign is the 
fountain of Justice. . . . With regard to him, there was no superior 
power; and, consequently, on feudal principles, no right of jurisdic-
tion.”13 Wilson characterized this as “only a branch of a much more 
extensive principle, on which a plan of systematic despotism has 
been lately formed in England, and prosecuted with unwearied as-
siduity and care.”14 
Wilson rejected this feudal notion of sovereignty as inconsistent 
with “another principle, very different in its nature and operations 
[that] forms . . . the basis of sound and genuine jurisprudence.”15 
This is the principle that “laws derived from the pure source of 
 
9 Id. at 456 (emphasis omitted). 
10 Id. (citing U.S. Const. art. III, § 3) (emphasis omitted). 
11 Id. at 457. 
12 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
13 Id. at 458 (emphasis omitted). 
14 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
15 Id. 
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equality and justice must be founded on the CONSENT of those, 
whose obedience they require. The sovereign, when traced to his 
source, must be found in the man.”16 In other words, obedience 
must rest on the consent of the only “sovereign” from which justice 
and equality rest: the individual person who is asked to obey the 
law. Wilson believed that the only reason “a free man is bound by 
human laws, is, that he binds himself. Upon the same principles, 
upon which he becomes bound by the laws, he becomes amenable 
to the Courts of Justice, which are formed and authorised by those 
laws.”17  
State governments are simply the product of these very same 
people, themselves bound by laws, who have banded together to 
form a government. As such, states are as bound by the law as are 
the ultimate sovereign individuals that establish them. “If one free 
man, an original sovereign, may do all this; why may not an aggre-
gate of free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this like-
wise? If the dignity of each singly is undiminished; the dignity of all 
jointly must be unimpaired.”18 
From this analysis Wilson reached the following conclusion 
about Georgia’s claim of sovereign immunity against a suit for 
breach of contract: 
A State, like a merchant, makes a contract. A dishonest State, 
like a dishonest merchant, wilfully refuses to discharge it: The 
latter is amenable to a Court of Justice: Upon general principles 
of right, shall the former when summoned to answer the fair de-
mands of its creditor, be permitted, proteus-like, to assume a new 
appearance, and to insult him and justice, by declaring I am a 
Sovereign State? Surely not.19 
That Justice Wilson was the author of this opinion is significant. 
James Wilson was as crucial a member of the Constitutional Con-
vention as any other, including James Madison. His defense of the 
Constitution in the Pennsylvania ratification convention was 
 
16 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
17 Id. at 456 (emphasis omitted). 
18 Id. (emphasis added and omitted). 
19 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
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lengthy and influential,20 and that state’s early ratification set the 
stage for the Constitution’s eventual adoption in other key states.21 
Wilson was also among the most theoretically sophisticated of the 
Founders, as his lectures on law given as a professor from 1790 to 
1792 at the College of Pennsylvania demonstrate.22 Indeed, one 
reason why his opinion in Chisholm may be overlooked is that it 
may seem too long and theoretical to be a good judicial opinion. 
Justice Wilson was not alone in locating sovereignty in the indi-
vidual person. Chief Justice Jay, in his opinion, referred tellingly to 
“the joint and equal sovereigns of this country.”23 Jay affirmed the 
“great and glorious principle, that the people are the sovereign of 
this country, and consequently that fellow citizens and joint sover-
eigns cannot be degraded by appearing with each other in their 
own Courts to have their controversies determined.”24 Denying in-
dividuals a right to sue a state, while allowing them to sue munici-
palities, “would not correspond with the equal rights we claim; with 
the equality we profess to admire and maintain, and with that 
popular sovereignty in which every citizen partakes.”25 Neither Wil-
son nor Jay’s individualist view of sovereignty fits comfortably into 
the notion of popular sovereignty as a purely “collective” concept.26 
 
20 Given that Wilson’s lengthy speeches were virtually the only ones reported in Eli-
ott’s debates for the Pennsylvania ratification convention, it would seem that he was 
thought to have been a crucial member of that convention. See 2 The Debates in the 
Several State Conventions on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution 415–542 
(photo. reprint 1974) (Jonathan Elliott ed., 2d ed. n.d.) (records of Pennsylvania de-
bates).  
21 Ratifying a week after Delaware, Pennsylvania was just the second state—and the 
first large one—to ratify the Constitution. 2 The Documentary History of the Consti-
tution of the United States of America 27 (photo. reprint 1965) (Washington, U.S. 
Dep’t of State 1894).  
22 See Mark David Hall, The Political and Legal Philosophy of James Wilson 1742–
1798, at 27–29 (1997) (describing the importance of Wilson’s lectures on law). 
23 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 477 (Jay, C.J.). 
24 Id. at 479 (emphasis added). 
25 Id. at 473 (emphasis added). 
26 Professor Elizabeth Price Foley captures the individualist concept of popular sov-
ereignty by calling it “residual individual sovereignty.” See Elizabeth Price Foley, 
Liberty for All: Reclaiming Individual Privacy in a New Era of Public Morality 42 
(2006) (“[O]ne of the foundational principles of American law—at both the state and 
federal level—is residual individual sovereignty.”). Professor William Casto has 
coined the phrase “the people’s sovereignty” to convey this idea. See William R. 
Casto, James Iredell and the American Origins of Judicial Review, 27 Conn. L. Rev. 
329, 330 (1995) (“[T]he idea of the people’s sovereignty should not be confused with 
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Even Justice Iredell, the sole dissenter in Chisholm, did not rest 
his dissent on a rejection of the joint and individual sovereignty of 
the people. Instead, he devoted the bulk of his opinion to the ques-
tion of whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear a 
breach of contract case in the absence of express authorization ei-
ther by the Constitution itself or by Congress. Because he con-
cluded that such authorization was both required and lacking, Ire-
dell contended that the suit should have been dismissed. Had this 
reasoning prevailed, there would have been no need to reach the 
issue of sovereignty, which Justice Iredell addresses only in pass-
ing.27 
Justice Wilson and Chief Justice Jay’s individualist concept of 
sovereignty was later passionately expanded upon by John Taylor 
in response to the Supreme Court’s opinion in McCulloch: 
I do not know how it has happened, that this word has crept 
into our political dialect, unless it be that mankind prefer mystery 
to knowledge; and that governments love obscurity better than 
specification. The unknown powers of sovereignty and suprem-
acy may be relished, because they tickle the mind with hopes and 
fears; just as we indulge the taste with Cayenne pepper, though it 
disorders the health, and finally destroys the body. Governments 
delight in a power to administer the palatable drugs of exclusive 
privileges and pecuniary gifts; and selfishness is willing enough to 
receive them; and this mutual pleasure may possibly have sug-
 
popular sovereignty, which carries connotations of democracy and universal suf-
frage.”). But it may well be anachronistic to concede the term “popular sovereignty” 
actually used by Chief Justice Jay to the modern collective reading. 
27 On the nature of sovereignty, Justice Iredell says,  
Every State in the Union in every instance where its sovereignty has not been 
delegated to the United States, I consider to be as compleatly sovereign, as the 
United States are in respect to the powers surrendered. The United States are 
sovereign as to all the powers of Government actually surrendered: Each State 
in the Union is sovereign as to all the powers reserved. It must necessarily be 
so, because the United States have no claim to any authority but such as the 
States have surrendered to them: Of course the part not surrendered must re-
main as it did before. 
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 435 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted). 
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gested the ingenious stratagem, for neutralizing constitutional re-
strictions by a single word . . . .28 
In his lengthy treatment of the subject Taylor notes, 
Sovereignty implies superiority and subordination. It was there-
fore inapplicable to a case of equality, and more so to the subor-
dinate power in reference to its creator. The word being rejected 
by our constitutions, cannot be correctly adopted for their con-
struction . . . . It would produce several very obvious contradic-
tions in our political principles. It would transfer sovereignty 
from the people, (confining it to mean the right of self-
government only,) to their own servants. It would invest govern-
ments and departments, invested with limited powers only, with 
unspecified powers. It would create many sovereignties, each 
having a right to determine the extent of its sovereignty by its 
own will. . . . Our constitutions, therefore, wisely rejected this in-
definite word as a traitor of civil rights, and endeavored to kill it 
dead by specifications and restrictions of power, that it might 
never again be used in political disquisitions.29 
While Justice Iredell would have afforded to states the sover-
eignty of kings, Taylor identifies whence kings appropriated the 
term. He observed that “the term ‘sovereignty,’ was sacrilegiously 
stolen from the attributes of God, and impiously assumed by 
kings.”30 He then condemned the importation of the concept into a 
republican system. “Though [kings] committed the theft, aristocra-
cies and republicks have claimed the spoil.”31 Taylor denied that 
the U.S. Constitution included the concept: 
By our constitutions, we rejected the errors upon which our fore-
fathers had been wrecked, and withheld from our governments 
the keys of temporal and eternal rights, by usurping which, their 
patriots had been converted into tyrants; and invested them only 
with powers to restrain internal wrongs, and to resist foreign hos-
 
28 John Taylor, Construction Construed, and Constitutions Vindicated 25 (The 
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 1998) (1820). 
29 Id. at 26 (emphasis added). 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
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tility; without designing to establish a sovereign power of robbing 
one citizen to enrich another.32 
By omitting Chisholm from the canon, students learn none of this. 
They are left unexposed to the radical yet fundamental idea that if 
anyone is sovereign, it is “We the People” as individuals, in con-
trast with the modern view that locates popular sovereignty in 
Congress or state legislatures, which supposedly represent the will 
of the people. 
Another reason for teaching Chisholm is that it represents the 
“road not taken” with respect to constitutional amendments. Con-
gress and the states chose to follow the advice of Justice Blair. “If 
the Constitution is found inconvenient in practice in this or any 
other particular,” he wrote in his opinion, “it is well that a regular 
mode is pointed out for amendment.”33 Precisely because its hold-
ing was reversed two years later by the ratification of the Eleventh 
Amendment, Chisholm represents an opportunity to consider how 
the practice of constitutional interpretation by courts might have 
been different if the tradition of correcting Supreme Court deci-
sions by express amendment had taken hold. 
The Eleventh Amendment reads as follows: “The Judicial power 
of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in 
law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United 
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of 
any Foreign State.”34 As I discuss below, there are two distinctly 
different ways by which this language “reversed” the Court’s deci-
sion in Chisholm. The first is the assumption of modern so-called 
Eleventh Amendment cases: the enactment of the Eleventh 
Amendment could imply that the Supreme Court had incorrectly 
interpreted the Constitution, and the Amendment therefore re-
stores its original meaning. But, second, the enactment of the Elev-
enth Amendment could imply instead that the Court was correct in 
its interpretation of Article III, but the states were so unhappy with 
this implication of the original meaning of the Constitution that 
they sought successfully to change the original meaning by using 
Article V. Somewhere in between these two implications lies the 
 
32 Id. at 26–27. 
33 Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 468 (Blair, J.). 
34 U.S. Const. amend. XI. 
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possibility that the Court’s decision was within the range of permis-
sible interpretations of the original text, as was the Eleventh 
Amendment, in which case, once again, the Court was not mis-
taken about the original meaning of the Constitution. 
In any case, if written amendments were socially accepted as a 
more normal reaction to an objectionable Supreme Court decision, 
the need perceived by some for the Supreme Court to engage in 
creative “interpretation” might be obviated. The rapid adoption of 
the Eleventh Amendment suggests that Article V constitutional 
amendments can be practical, provided the legal and political cul-
ture views amendments as a natural response either to a Supreme 
Court misinterpretation of the Constitution or to a correct inter-
pretation of our imperfect Constitution with which there is wide-
spread dissatisfaction. Today, lacking a culture of written amend-
ment, correct but objectionable interpretations of the Constitution 
have to be treated as misinterpretations to justify judicial interven-
tion. 
II. WHY WE NEGLECT CHISHOLM 
Before addressing what the Eleventh Amendment should be 
understood to imply about the correctness of the decision in Chis-
holm, it is worth pausing for a moment to ask why Chisholm and 
the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment are usually omitted from 
the canon—the set of cases almost always covered in the basic 
course on constitutional law. There are at least three plausible rea-
sons. First, constitutional law is ordinarily taught doctrine by doc-
trine, rather than chronologically. If one organizes the course by 
modern doctrines, there is no obvious or natural place in which to 
include Chisholm because the nature of “sovereignty” is not among 
the doctrines normally taught in either the structures or the rights 
portions of constitutional law. 
True, Chisholm and the Eleventh Amendment could be taught 
in a traditional “structures” course, and some professors surely do. 
Because, however, professors do not traditionally cover the con-
cept of “sovereignty” in constitutional law and consider the doc-
trine of sovereign immunity an additional doctrinal topic—and a 
complex one at that—Chisholm itself is typically omitted. By the 
same token, when teaching constitutional law doctrine by doctrine, 
there is no natural place in which to cover the case of Prigg v. 
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Pennsylvania,35 which concerns the meaning of the Fugitive Slave 
Clause. Even the pivotal case of Dred Scott v. Sanford36 does not fit 
neatly into introductory courses devoted mainly to structural is-
sues. 
Were constitutional law taught chronologically rather than doc-
trine by doctrine, it would be an open invitation to begin the course 
by studying the first great constitutional controversy—the debate 
in Congress and within the Washington administration over the 
first Bank of the United States—and follow that with the question 
that occupied the Supreme Court in Chisholm, its first major deci-
sion: the nature of sovereignty in the United States. And it would 
be equally natural to move from there to coverage of the Marshall 
Court’s famous decisions—Marbury v. Madison, McCulloch v. 
Maryland, and Gibbons v. Ogden—followed by the infamous slav-
ery decisions of the Taney Court. 
An opening sequence such as this would convey to students an 
entirely different impression of the subject of constitutional law 
than does the more typical approach that is organized by doctrine 
and often begins with Marbury. It would also make far more mean-
ingful to students both Chief Justice Marshall’s views on the nature 
of sovereignty that he articulates in McCulloch,37 which otherwise 
seem superfluous, and Chief Justice Taney’s views of sovereignty 
expressed in Dred Scott.38 In other words, Chisholm is just the first 
of several landmark Supreme Court treatments of the nature of 
sovereignty, but dropping it from the canon distorts the teaching of 
this subject, as the Marshall Court opinions are studied out of con-
text.39 
 
35 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). 
36 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856). 
37 See 17 U.S. at 404–05 (“The government of the Union, then . . . is, emphatically, 
and truly, a government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from 
them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and 
for their benefit.”). 
38 See 60 U.S. at 404 (“The words ‘people of the United States’ and ‘citizens’ are 
synonymous terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe the political body 
who, according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold the 
power and conduct the Government through their representatives. They are what we 
familiarly call the ‘sovereign people,’ and every citizen is one of this people, and a 
constituent member of this sovereignty.”). 
39 To this sequence I also add the discussion of sovereignty articulated in James 
Madison’s Report to the Virginia House of Delegates. See James Madison, Report on 
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The second reason we lead with Marbury rather than with Chis-
holm is that, until relatively recently, constitutional law professors 
in the post-Warren Court era viewed judicial review as an engine 
of social justice. Although enthusiasm for judicial review has 
waned in recent years—as witnessed by the recent interest in “judi-
cial minimalism,”40 “taking the Constitution away from the 
courts,”41 and “popular constitutionalism”42—this current intellec-
tual trend has yet to affect the organization of the basic courses in 
constitutional law. So judicial review still kicks off most casebooks 
that were devised years before interest developed in “the constitu-
tion outside the courts.”43 
A third reason for omitting Chisholm is that, according to “mod-
ern” Supreme Court decisions dating back to the 1890 case of Hans 
v. Louisiana,44 the Eleventh Amendment repudiated Chisholm’s 
view of sovereignty, and, therefore, the decision itself is a dead let-
ter. Even when professors include the Eleventh Amendment in the 
basic constitutional law course, they cover it well after Marbury 
and usually relegate Chisholm to a passing footnote in the cover-
age of the modern Eleventh Amendment cases.  
 
the Alien and Sedition Acts, reprinted in Writings 608, 611 (Jack N. Rakove ed., 1999) 
(“The constitution of the United States was formed by the sanction of the states, 
given by each in its sovereign capacity. . . . The states then being the parties to the 
constitutional compact, and in their sovereign capacity, it follows of necessity, that 
there can be no tribunal above their authority, to decide in the last resort, whether the 
compact made by them be violated . . . .”). 
40 See Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme 
Court (1999). 
41 See Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from the Courts (1999). 
42 See Larry D. Kramer, The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Ju-
dicial Review (2004). 
43 See Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Interpretation Outside the Courts, 37 J. Inter-
disc. Hist. 415, 415 (2007) (“By the late twentieth century, the Constitution had be-
come the property of lawyers and, especially, judges. When the public paid attention 
to constitutional issues, it focused on the Supreme Court. In the 1990s, however, sev-
eral scholars in law and political science turned their attention to ‘the Constitution 
outside the courts.’ Much of their concern was normative. The hopes that they may 
have had for a liberal, reformist Supreme Court on the model of Chief Justice Earl 
Warren’s had been decisively dashed. But they could draw support for their claim that 
legislatures had an important role in constitutional interpretation by gesturing toward 
the past, citing prominent examples of congressional and executive constitutional in-
terpretation.”). 
44 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
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This last reason for ignoring Chisholm—that the adoption of the 
Eleventh Amendment repudiated it—is the subject of the balance of 
this Essay. I contest the modern Court’s claim that the Eleventh 
Amendment repudiated the view of sovereignty the Court had previ-
ously adopted in Chisholm. Although I am hardly the first person to 
question this claim,45 I hope to add to the current discussion by offering 
a comparison of the wording of the Ninth and Eleventh Amendments 
that undercuts the claim that the Eleventh Amendment repudiated the 
individualist concept of sovereignty the Court relied upon in Chisholm. 
Consequently, I join a diverse group of other scholars who have con-
cluded that the modern Supreme Court’s so-called Eleventh Amend-
ment line of cases is based on a faulty reading of the Eleventh 
Amendment dating back to Hans and is fundamentally misconceived. 
III. WHY THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT DID NOT REPUDIATE 
CHISHOLM’S APPROACH TO POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY 
To assess the relationship between the Eleventh Amendment 
and Chisholm, it is useful to identify clearly the two alternative 
readings of the Amendment. First, the Amendment could be read 
narrowly as simply reversing the holding of Chisholm that states 
may be sued by citizens of other states in federal court. Of course, 
by also immunizing states from suits by subjects of foreign nations, 
the Amendment does more than this, which may be significant, as 
we shall see. According to this interpretation, the Eleventh 
 
45 See, e.g., Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Im-
munity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. Pa. L. Rev. 515 (1978) (arguing that sovereign 
immunity is a common law doctrine and not constitutionally compelled); William A. 
Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Con-
struction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against 
Jurisdiction, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 1033 (1983) (arguing that the Amendment does not 
cover federal question or admiralty jurisdiction); John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh 
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 
1889 (1983) (arguing from a historical standpoint that the Amendment’s passage was 
primarily secured as part of a bargain to enforce the peace treaty); Vicki C. Jackson, 
Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amendment 
and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 Notre Dame L. Rev. 953, 1010 (2000) (arguing that 
“sovereign immunity is in some respects unjust” and “the Eleventh Amendment need 
not be understood to have endorsed that injustice as a general proposition”); James 
E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An “Explanatory” Account of the Eleventh 
Amendment, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 1269 (1998) (arguing that the Amendment repre-
sented a compromise on fiscal policy between the states and the federal government). 
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Amendment leaves entirely intact the underlying individualist con-
cept of popular sovereignty upon which the Court rested its hold-
ing. The Amendment merely negates one constitutional implica-
tion of this more general concept of popular sovereignty. 
A second reading of the Amendment is the one adopted by the 
Supreme Court in Hans v. Louisiana that continues to be accepted 
by the Court today. In Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, Chief 
Justice Rehnquist provided a concise summary of this position: 
Although the text of the Amendment would appear to restrict 
only the Article III diversity jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
“we have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so 
much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it con-
firms.” That presupposition, first observed over a century ago in 
Hans v. Louisiana, has two parts: first, that each State is a sover-
eign entity in our federal system; and second, that “‘[i]t is inher-
ent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of 
an individual without its consent.’”46 
Chief Justice Rehnquist excoriates the dissent for “relying upon the 
now-discredited decision in Chisholm v. Georgia.”47 And he affirms 
the Court’s conclusion in Hans that the views of state sovereignty ar-
ticulated by Justice Iredell in his dissent “were clearly right,—as the 
people of the United States in their sovereign capacity subsequently 
decided” when it enacted the Eleventh Amendment.48 
The modern Eleventh Amendment doctrine, therefore, rests not 
on the literal text of the Amendment, but rather on what the Court 
claims to be its underlying principle—what Chief Justice Rehnquist 
referred to as the Amendment’s “presupposition,”49 and what Jus-
tice Kennedy referred to in Alden v. Maine as “fundamental postu-
lates implicit in the constitutional design.”50 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist is quite forthright about his departure from the text in 
favor of a more reasonable construction: 
The dissent’s lengthy analysis of the text of the Eleventh 
Amendment is directed at a straw man—we long have recog-
 
46 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (citations omitted). 
47 Id. at 68. 
48 Hans, 134 U.S. at 14. 
49 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54. 
50 527 U.S. 706, 729 (1999). 
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nized that blind reliance upon the text of the Eleventh Amend-
ment is “‘to strain the Constitution and the law to a construction 
never imagined or dreamed of.’” The text dealt in terms only 
with the problem presented by the decision in Chisholm . . . .51 
As I have already noted, however, this last sentence is not quite 
true. The text of the Eleventh Amendment goes beyond the nar-
row problem of a state being sued by a citizen of another state in 
federal court and extends to suits by “citizens or subjects of any 
foreign state.” Professor John Manning finds this to be significant: 
Indeed, so discriminating is the text that it parses a subcategory 
from amidst the final head of jurisdiction (“Controversies . . . be-
tween a State . . . and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects”), leav-
ing untouched suits between a state and “foreign States” while 
restricting suits against states by “foreign . . . Citizens or Sub-
jects.” As a first cut, this fact suggests at least that the Amend-
ment’s framers carefully picked and chose among Article III, 
Section 2, Clause 1’s categories in determining what jurisdic-
tional immunity to prescribe.52 
From this, Manning concludes that “[t]he Eleventh Amendment’s 
careful inclusion and omission of particular heads of Article III ju-
risdiction creates at least a prima facie case that the amendment 
process entailed judgments about the precise contexts in which it 
was desirable (or perhaps politically feasible) to provide for state 
sovereign immunity.”53 
It is striking that the Court, beginning with Hans and continuing 
through today, has employed a version of originalism that, in re-
cent years, has been repudiated by most originalists. This version is 
based on the original intentions of either the framers or ratifiers, 
rather than upon the original public meaning of the text they 
 
51 Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 69 (quoting Hans, 134 U.S. at 15) (citation omitted); 
see also Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934) (“Manifestly, 
we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of § 2 of Article III, or as-
sume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the restrictions upon suits 
against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the constitutional provisions are 
postulates which limit and control.”). 
52 John F. Manning, The Eleventh Amendment and the Reading of Precise Consti-
tutional Texts, 113 Yale L.J. 1663, 1739 (2004). 
53 Id.; see also Jackson, supra note 45, at 1000 (“The precision and specificity of its 
language lend themselves to (though they do not compel) a narrow reading.”). 
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adopted. By using the principles, “presuppositions,” or “postu-
lates” allegedly held by the drafters to override the public meaning 
of the text itself, the Court in Hans employed the same version of 
original intent originalism that Chief Justice Taney used in Dred 
Scott when interpreting the meaning of “the People” in the Pream-
ble and in the Declaration of Independence.54  
Justice Bradley’s opinion in Hans exemplifies a typical feature of 
original intent originalism: its reliance on the counterfactual hypo-
thetical intentions of the framers. 
Can we suppose that, when the Eleventh Amendment was 
adopted, it was understood to be left open for citizens of a State 
to sue their own state in the federal courts, whilst the idea of suits 
by citizens of other states, or of foreign states, was indignantly 
repelled? Suppose that Congress, when proposing the Eleventh 
Amendment, had appended to it a proviso that nothing therein 
contained should prevent a State from being sued by its own citi-
zens in cases arising under the Constitution or laws of the United 
States[;] can we imagine that it would have been adopted by the 
States? The supposition that it would is almost an absurdity on 
its face.55 
How similar this sounds to Chief Justice Taney’s method in Dred 
Scott.56 
Given the certitude with which a majority of Justices now be-
lieve that the Court’s interpretation of the text in Chisholm was er-
roneous and that the Eleventh Amendment merely reestablished 
 
54 The use of original intent to narrow the meaning of the text of the Reconstruction 
Amendments was a favorite technique of the Reconstruction Court, beginning as 
early as the Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). Although decided 
after Reconstruction ended, Hans exemplifies this interpretive practice. On the other 
hand, it could be argued that these background presuppositions and postulates in-
formed the public meaning of Article III that four of five members of the Supreme 
Court in Chisholm, including so principal a framer as James Wilson, then proceeded 
to ignore. 
55 Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. 
56 See 60 U.S. at 416 (“It cannot be supposed that [the State sovereignties] intended 
to secure to [free blacks] rights, and privileges, and rank, in the new political body 
throughout the Union, which every one of them denied within the limits of its own 
dominion. More especially, it cannot be believed that the large slaveholding States 
regarded them as included in the word citizens, or would have consented to a Consti-
tution which might compel them to receive them in that character from another 
State.”). 
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the status quo ante, it is useful to remember that Chief Justice John 
Marshall apparently did not agree. In Fletcher v. Peck, he contin-
ued to affirm that the Court’s reading of the Constitution in Chis-
holm was correct until the text was altered by the Eleventh 
Amendment.57 In a much-neglected passage, he described the prin-
ciple that states were amenable to suit in federal court as 
originally ingrafted in that instrument, though no longer a part of 
it. The constitution, as passed, gave the courts of the United 
States jurisdiction in suits brought against individual States. A 
state, then, which violated its own contract was suable in the 
courts of the United States for that violation. . . . This feature is 
no longer found in the constitution; but it aids in the construction 
of those clauses with which it was originally associated.58 
In other words, in Fletcher, Marshall explicitly rejected the proposi-
tion that Chisholm was incorrectly decided—the proposition first 
asserted in Hans some one hundred years after the adoption of the 
Eleventh Amendment. And, like the Court in Chisholm, Marshall 
rejected an argument “in favour of presuming an intention to ex-
cept a case, not excepted by the words of the constitution.”59  
In his article, Manning defends the narrow interpretation of the 
Eleventh Amendment by making an important methodological 
claim about originalist textualism: specific constitutional text 
should be interpreted specifically according to its terms and not 
expanded, contracted, or contradicted by the purposes, original in-
tentions, or underlying principles for which the text was adopted. 
“Given the heightened consensus requirements imposed by Article 
V,” he writes, 
when an amendment speaks with exceptional specificity, inter-
preters must be sensitive to the possibility that the drafters were 
willing to go or realistically could go only so far and no farther 
with their policy. When such compromise is evident, respect for 
the minority veto indicates that those implementing the amend-
ment should hew closely to the lines actually drawn, lest they 
disturb some unrecorded concession insisted upon by the mi-
 
57 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
58 Id. at 139 (emphasis added).  
59 Id. (interpreting the Contracts Clause). 
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nority or offered preemptively by the majority as part of the 
price of assent.60 
“In short,” Manning continues, “when the amendment process ad-
dresses a specific question and resolves it in a precise way, greater 
cause exists for interpreters to worry about invoking general 
sources of constitutional authority to submerge the carefully drawn 
lines of a more specific compromise.”61 
Manning suggests that one justification for the conclusion that 
the original public meaning of the Eleventh Amendment was lim-
ited to its precise terms is based on the legal background against 
which the Amendment was adopted.62 The most salient background 
assumption for the Eleventh Amendment was the Court’s decision 
in Chisholm in which four of five Justices denied the existence, as a 
general matter, of state sovereign immunity, with Justices Wilson 
and Jay specifically “assert[ing] that state sovereign immunity was 
flatly incompatible with the premises of our republican form of 
government.”63 
According to the Chisholm Court, states may be sued by indi-
viduals in federal court to enforce their private contractual rights; 
and the states’ assertion that the text of Article III should be quali-
fied by an unenumerated immunity from suit based on their sover-
eignty is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of republi-
canism on which the Constitution rests. The Court’s decision in 
Chisholm, therefore, put before Congress, the states, and the peo-
ple of the nation a proposition concerning the nature of sover-
eignty that, while it may have been implicit in the text of Article 
III, might not have been widely apparent. With this issue now un-
equivocally presented by the decision in Chisholm, did Congress 
respond with an amendment squarely rejecting the Court’s view of 
popular sovereignty as resting in the People as individuals rather 
than in the states? It did not. Instead, it responded with a very nar-
row, precisely worded withdrawal of judicial power—subject-
matter jurisdiction—in two specific circumstances. 
 
60 Manning, supra note 52, at 1735–36. 
61 Id. at 1736. 
62 See id. at 1743 (“[T]o evaluate the Amendment’s limited enumeration of excep-
tions, it is helpful to know the legal baseline against which the adopters acted.”). 
63 Id. at 1743–44. 
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Would the Eleventh Amendment have been ratified so swiftly, 
or at all, if it had been more broadly worded? Manning contends 
that we can never know the answer to this question. The wording 
of the Amendment could well have been a product of compromise 
within the drafting process or have been drafted in anticipation of 
potential, but not yet realized, opposition to a broader claim of 
state sovereignty. To interpret the Amendment more broadly than 
the language that was actually proposed and ratified is to run a se-
rious risk of overriding the desires of either a majority or a poten-
tial ratification-blocking minority who would never have consented 
to a broader claim of state power. Furthermore, it may well have 
been the case that nationalist Federalists in Congress gave the 
states the bare minimum needed to mollify them. Again, because it 
is impossible to know for certain, the Court should adhere to the 
public meaning of the text actually adopted, rather than overriding 
specific text by appealing to an allegedly broad underlying purpose 
or principle. 
Manning’s summary of his argument here is worth quoting at 
length: 
Neither Article III nor any other provision of the original Consti-
tution dealt directly with the problem of sovereign immunity, and 
American society had had no previous occasion to confront the 
question squarely, one way or the other. When dissatisfaction 
with Chisholm brought the Article V process to bear on that pre-
viously unanswered question, the text that emerged quite clearly 
went so far and no farther in embracing state sovereign immu-
nity. Perhaps the resultant line-drawing merely reflected an in-
ability to secure the requisite supermajorities for a broader 
Amendment. But if so, that would be fully consistent with the 
expected play of Article V. Especially in the context of an 
amendment process designed to protect political minorities, one 
cannot disregard the selective inclusion and exclusion implicit in 
such careful specification. If American society for the first time 
was explicitly confronting the appropriate limitations on poten-
tial Article III jurisdiction over suits against states, one should 
perhaps attach significance not only to what the drafters placed 
in the Amendment, but also to what they deemed necessary or 
even prudent to exclude. To do otherwise would risk upsetting 
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whatever precise compromise may have emerged from the care-
fully drawn lawmaking process prescribed by Article V.64 
Although I find persuasive Manning’s argument against using 
underlying purposes to expand the specific wording of the Elev-
enth Amendment, he fails to consider another possible defense of 
the Court’s so-called Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Consti-
tutional texts not only have a literal grammatical meaning in them-
selves; they also have what Professor Lawrence Solum has called 
“constitutional implicature.”65 These implications can be express 
references in the text to concepts or can be implied affirmances of 
underlying assumptions that went unmentioned in the text. Shifting 
the assumptions underlying the text would distort, rather than 
faithfully adhere to, the public meaning of the text. 
An implication of the text is not the same as its purpose. A piece 
of text can have many purposes, and these purposes are largely ex-
tratextual. A particular provision of a text is very likely to be either 
under- or overinclusive of its underlying purposes, or both. More-
over, while there was a demonstrable consensus concerning the 
adoption of a particular wording of a text, there may have been no 
comparable consensus about underlying purposes. In contrast, an 
implication of the text is a product of its meaning, though it may 
not be expressed in so many words. While saying one thing, it may 
imply something compatible with, though beyond, what it says. 
And the original public meaning of the Constitution might be dis-
torted if this implication is later denied or reversed, while the spe-
cific expressed meaning of the text is preserved. 
A good example of constitutional implicature can be found in 
the Ninth Amendment, the only other provision of the Constitu-
tion explicitly to provide a rule for how the Constitution “shall not 
be construed.” The Ninth Amendment says, “The enumeration in 
the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or 
disparage others retained by the people.”66 Read literally, the Ninth 
Amendment rejects just one construction of the text: a construc-
 
64 Id. at 1748–49. 
65 See Posting of Lawrence Solum to Legal Theory Blog, Sentence Meaning and Clause 
Meaning, http://lsolum.typepad.com/legaltheory/2006/12/over_at_books_d.html (Dec. 12, 
2006, 6:25 a.m.). See generally Paul Grice, Studies in the Way of Words 23–57 (1991) (dis-
cussing “conversational implicature”).  
66 U.S. Const. amend. IX. 
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tion that is based on “the enumeration in the Constitution, of cer-
tain rights.” Its injunction applies only when the enumeration of 
certain rights in the Constitution is offered as a reason for denying 
others retained by the people. According to this reading, the Ninth 
Amendment would have no application whatsoever outside the as-
sertion of this specific misconstruction based on the enumeration 
of rights. 
Before questioning this claim, it is important to stress that even 
this limited reading of the Ninth Amendment as solely a “rule of 
construction” in this one circumstance would render it extremely 
important. Such a reading would specifically negate a key claim of 
the most important footnote in Supreme Court history that says, in 
relevant part: “There may be narrower scope for operation of the 
presumption of constitutionality when legislation appears on its 
face to be within a specific prohibition of the Constitution, such as 
those of the first ten amendments, which are deemed equally spe-
cific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth.”67 Footnote 
Four of United States v. Carolene Products is directly asserting that 
the enumeration in the Constitution of certain “express prohibi-
tions” is reason “to deny or disparage” any constitutional claims 
based on “other rights retained by the people.” Even were the pre-
sumption of constitutionality affirmed in Carolene Products simply 
a burden-shifting presumption, it would disparage the other rights 
retained by the people, though perhaps not deny them altogether. 
But later, in cases such as Williamson v. Lee Optical,68 the “pre-
sumption” was rendered effectively irrebuttable, resulting in the 
effective denial of unenumerated rights until Griswold v. Connecti-
cut.69 
Today’s judicial conservatives urge a return, not to the original 
meaning of the Ninth Amendment—even narrowly construed as 
above—but to the New Deal Court’s philosophy of Footnote Four 
when they disparage the protection by the courts of any unenu-
merated rights. For example, Justice Scalia, in his dissent in Troxel 
v. Granville, wrote that “the Constitution’s refusal to ‘deny or dis-
parage’ other rights is far removed from affirming any one of them, 
 
67 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (emphasis 
added). 
68 348 U.S. 483 (1955). 
69 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
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and even further removed from authorizing judges to identify what 
they might be, and to enforce the judges’ list against laws duly en-
acted by the people.”70 Notice Justice Scalia’s rather blithe identifi-
cation of the legislature with the people themselves, an equation 
that was widely rejected at the founding and expressly denied by 
the Supreme Court in Chisholm. 
I want to claim, however, that the text of the Ninth Amendment 
does more than expressly reject the construction of the Constitu-
tion provided by Footnote Four; it also implies the existence of 
other rights retained by the people. Why? For one thing, it refers 
explicitly to these “other[]”71 rights. While it does not expressly call 
for the affirmative protection of these rights, the rule of construc-
tion it proposes would make absolutely no sense if there were no 
such other rights. Why else would an entire amendment have been 
added to the Constitution barring a construction of enumerated 
rights that would deny or disparage these other rights? Of course, 
we have overwhelming historical evidence, independent of the text, 
that the Founders believed that the people possessed individual 
natural rights. But the Ninth Amendment adds a textual affirma-
tion of this underlying assumption of the text that could otherwise 
be denied. Therefore, notwithstanding the limits of its express in-
junction, the existence of the Ninth Amendment’s reference to 
other rights retained by the people provides important textual sup-
port for the following conclusion: any construction of the Constitu-
tion that results in the denial of these rights would violate the Con-
stitution’s original public meaning, not merely a construction based 
on the enumeration of certain rights. 
Does my claim that the rule of construction provided by the 
Ninth Amendment has important implications for the protection of 
other rights that are not to be denied shed any light on the meaning 
of the Eleventh Amendment? Could the Supreme Court’s invoca-
tion of the “presupposition” of state sovereignty likewise be justi-
fied as an implication of its specific text rather than as a reflection 
of the underlying purpose of the Eleventh Amendment as charac-
terized by John Manning? Just as the Ninth Amendment presup-
poses and textually affirms the existence of unenumerated rights, 
 
70 530 U.S. 57, 91 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
71 See U.S. Const. amend. IX. 
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might the Eleventh Amendment not presuppose and textually af-
firm the existence of state sovereignty? This seems to be what 
Chief Justice Rehnquist was suggesting when he dismissed a “blind 
reliance” on the text of the Amendment in Seminole Tribe.72 A 
“blind reliance” would be limiting the text to its terms while deny-
ing what it implies, whether a blind reliance on the text of the 
Ninth Amendment that limits it solely to a narrow rule of construc-
tion or a blind reliance on the text of the Eleventh Amendment 
that limits it solely to barring two specific types of plaintiffs suing 
state governments in federal court. 
A careful comparison of the Ninth and Eleventh Amendments, 
however, undermines, rather than supports, a claim that the text of 
the Eleventh Amendment implies the rejection of the broad rea-
soning of Chisholm. First, and most obviously, unlike the Ninth 
Amendment’s explicit reference to “others retained by the peo-
ple,” the Eleventh Amendment contains no explicit reference ei-
ther to a principle of state sovereignty or to a doctrine of state sov-
ereign immunity. The Ninth Amendment’s injunction against 
drawing a particular conclusion from “the enumeration in the con-
stitution of certain rights” contains within it an express reference 
to—and therefore an implied affirmation of—the “other” rights 
“retained by the people,” coupled with the additional implication 
that these rights not be “denied or disparaged.” 
To reach a contrary conclusion about the Ninth Amendment 
would require acceptance of the proposition that there are no 
other rights retained by the people or that those rights that do exist 
may be denied or disparaged at the will of the legislature, provided 
only that such a denial is not justified on the ground that some 
rights were enumerated. But why foreclose this, and only this, justi-
fication of denying unenumerated rights by means of a constitu-
tional amendment? Clearly, the denial of unenumerated rights was 
the general evil to be avoided, and the Amendment was included 
to guard against a particular source of this evil that was aggravated 
by the addition of “the enumeration in the Constitution of certain 
rights.” And the source of this evil is the foreseeable assertion of 
the doctrine of expressio unius: to express or include one thing im-
plies the exclusion of the other. 
 
72 See supra text accompanying notes 46–51. 
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Although the text of the Eleventh Amendment lacks any com-
parable textual reference to state sovereignty or state sovereign 
immunity, would it nevertheless be fair to infer these concepts 
from what the text does affirm? I think not. To see why, let us 
imagine a hypothetical amendment dealing with unenumerated 
rights whose origin would parallel that of the Eleventh. Recall that 
for two years after the ratification of the Constitution, there was no 
Bill of Rights, so there was no express prohibition on takings of 
private property for public use. Suppose that during this period, 
the federal government took land for the public use of building a 
post office without making just compensation to the property 
owner. When the owner brings suit for compensation, the govern-
ment denies the existence of any such right to compensation. 
Now suppose further that, notwithstanding the absence of an ex-
press Takings Clause, the Supreme Court holds that the property 
owner is nevertheless entitled to just compensation. The opinions 
of the Justices are clearly based, first and foremost, on an extensive 
analysis of the preexistent natural rights retained by the people 
that no republican government can properly deny or disparage, in-
cluding the rights to life, liberty, property, and the pursuit of hap-
piness. One Justice in the majority—call him “Justice Chase”—
contends that  
[t]here are certain vital principles in our free Republican gov-
ernments, which will determine and over-rule an apparent and 
flagrant abuse of legislative power; as to authorize manifest injus-
tice by positive law; or to take away that security for personal 
liberty, or private property, for the protection whereof the gov-
ernment was established.73 
Textually, the Court grounds its holding in the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, reasoning that a law authorizing a taking of private 
property for public use without just compensation is not a “proper” 
law. A lone dissenter—call him “Justice Iredell”—protests this re-
liance on unenumerated rights. In his words, “[i]t is true, that some 
speculative jurists have held, that a legislative act against natural 
justice must, in itself, be void; but I cannot think that, under such a 
 
73 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) (emphasis omitted). 
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government, any Court of Justice would possess a power to declare 
it so.”74 
Far from being entirely hypothetical, the Court eventually used 
just this type of reasoning when it first required states to make just 
compensation for their takings under the Due Process Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. In Chicago, Burlington & Quincy 
R.R. Co. v. Chicago, it interpreted the Fourteenth Amendment as 
barring states from taking property for public use without just 
compensation, not by “incorporating” or even invoking the ex-
pressed Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, but because the 
“[d]ue protection of the rights of property has been regarded as a 
vital principle of republican institutions.”75 Consequently, 
if . . . a legislative enactment, assuming arbitrarily to take the 
property of one individual and give it to another individual, 
would not be due process of law as enjoined by the Fourteenth 
Amendment, it must be that the requirement of due process of 
law in that amendment is applicable to the direct appropriation 
by the State to public use and without compensation of the pri-
vate property of the citizen. The legislature may prescribe a form 
of procedure to be observed in the taking of private property for 
public use, but it is not due process of law if provision be not 
made for compensation.76 
Now imagine that Congress, in direct response to this hypotheti-
cal “takings” decision of the Court, seeks to “overrule” it by enact-
ing a constitutional amendment. Two versions are proposed. The 
first reads, “The judicial power of the United States shall not be 
construed to encompass the power to grant just compensation as a 
remedy for takings of private property for public use.” The second 
reads, “This Constitution shall not be construed to encompass a ju-
dicial power to enforce any right not expressly enumerated 
herein.” Congress then chooses to propose, and the states to ratify, 
the first rather than the second of these amendments. 
A century later it is argued that the enacted text presupposes 
that no unenumerated rights are ever to be judicially protected. 
Given this sequence of events, would this be a permissible con-
 
74 Id. at 398 (Iredell, J.). 
75 166 U.S. 226, 235–36 (1897). 
76 Id. at 236. 
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struction of the amendment actually ratified? Would it be reason-
able to claim that the substance of the second proposed version 
was implied by adopting the text of the first? Or would it instead 
be more reasonable to conclude, first, that the scope of the 
amendment actually adopted was limited solely to takings; and, 
second, that by adopting the first version rather than the second, 
Congress declined to reverse the broader reasoning of the Court 
that put the issue of the right to compensation before the Con-
gress? In other words, unlike the broader version, the narrowly 
worded amendment left the broad reasoning of the Court intact. 
Why Congress might have chosen the narrower amendment may 
be unknowable. Perhaps it accepted the Court’s general reasoning 
about unenumerated constitutional rights but rejected its implica-
tion for the particular right to compensation for public takings. 
Perhaps it disliked the Court’s general reasoning but was fearful 
that the more general amendment would get hung up in the ratifi-
cation process, and it took what it felt confident it could get. Man-
ning’s point is that we cannot know for sure everything that might 
have led Congress to choose the narrow formulation. 
Would it change the analysis if only the narrow version of the 
amendment had been proposed, so that the broader wording was 
not directly rejected in favor of the narrower reading? While per-
haps reducing our certainty a tiny bit, I think such a change in the 
hypothetical does not affect the ultimate conclusion. For in the hy-
pothetical story that produced the amendment, it was the notorious 
assertion by the Court of a general judicial power to protect un-
enumerated rights that engendered the controversy. Knowing this, 
Congress nevertheless addressed just one application of this more 
general power. The conclusion remains that Congress left this judi-
cially claimed power intact. This is not to claim that the original ju-
dicial opinion was necessarily a correct interpretation of the Con-
stitution but only that the subsequent hypothetical amendment 
narrowly reversing its holding did not challenge its interpretive 
correctness. 
The narrowly drafted words of the Eleventh Amendment were 
adopted by Congress in the face of the Court’s open denial of state 
sovereignty, especially in the opinions of Justice Wilson and Chief 
Justice Jay. In so doing, Congress turned away from more broadly 
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worded amendments. For example, Massachusetts Congressman 
Theodore Sedgwick initially proposed the following amendment: 
That no state shall be liable to be made a party defendant, in any 
of the judicial courts, established, or which shall be established 
under the authority of the United States, at the suit of any person 
or persons, whether a citizen or citizens, or a foreigner or for-
eigners, or of any body politic or corporate, whether within or 
without the United States . . . .77 
But even this more sweeping grant of immunity speaks in the juris-
dictional terms of Article III and concerns the scope of the judicial 
power, rather than confronting directly the Supreme Court’s denial 
of the concept of state sovereignty itself. The terms of the public 
debate over Chisholm focused primarily on the “suability” of 
states, not on their “sovereignty.”78 It is not clear whether Chief 
Justice Rehnquist believed that the Eleventh Amendment should 
be viewed as a repudiation of the principle that the people and not 
the states are sovereign. It is, however, certain that he adduced no 
evidence that those who proposed and ratified the Eleventh 
Amendment did so in order to establish that the prerogatives of 
state government equaled those of the English King. 
CONCLUSION: THE DANGEROUSNESS OF CHISHOLM 
Let me conclude by emphasizing what I am not claiming in this 
Essay. Despite the time I have spent discussing the Eleventh 
Amendment, this is not an essay about its original meaning. A rich 
 
77 5 The Documentary History of the Supreme Court 605–06 (Maeva Marcus ed., 
1994); see id. at 597 (“The motion was tabled and apparently never taken up again.”). 
78 See Pfander, supra note 45, at 1279–80 (“By treating the problem as one of state 
suability, I have consciously chosen to adopt the usage of the generation that framed 
and ratified the Eleventh Amendment, and to abandon the language of state sover-
eign immunity that modern courts and commentators frequently use to characterize 
the Eleventh Amendment. . . . This modern talk of sovereign immunity suggests that 
the Eleventh Amendment marked a complete Anti-Federalist victory in the battle 
over state suability; in truth, the two parties appear to have reached a compromise. In 
any event, once the Court begins to conceptualize the problem of state suability in 
terms of a free-standing principle of “sovereign immunity,” rather than as a technical 
problem in the parsing of the language of judicial power, it unleashes a dangerous and 
unwieldy restriction on the federal courts’ power to enforce federal-law restrictions 
against the states. By returning to the language of state suability, I hope to cabin the 
influence of this spurious principle of sovereign immunity.” (footnotes omitted)).  
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and challenging literature examining this issue already exists. Nor 
am I proposing that we start our teaching of constitutional law by 
examining the scope and meaning of the Eleventh Amendment. 
That may well be too complex for students just beginning their 
study of the Constitution to comprehend. 
Rather, my only claim about the Eleventh Amendment is to 
identify a single meaning it did not have. Contrary to what the Su-
preme Court now maintains, the Eleventh Amendment was not a 
repudiation of the individualist conception of popular sovereignty 
articulated by Justice Wilson and Chief Justice Jay. The narrow 
and technical language of the Eleventh Amendment could not rea-
sonably have been understood either as a repudiation of the grand 
and magisterial idea that “We the People” are sovereign or as es-
tablishing the power of the English monarchy as the model of state 
government authority. Given all this, I submit that beginning the 
study of constitutional law with the deep issues in Chisholm, as 
well as with the importance of constitutional amendments, is pref-
erable to beginning with Chief Justice Marshall’s defense of judi-
cial review in Marbury as has become the custom. 
Second, I am not claiming that Congress was affirming the 
broader reasoning of the case when it reversed only the narrow 
holding of Chisholm. John Manning seems to suggest otherwise,79 
and he may well be right. But, for the present, I am merely denying 
that the broader principle of state sovereignty to which Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist referred was a “presupposition” of the text of the 
Eleventh Amendment. So far as constitutional implicature is con-
cerned, the Eleventh Amendment leaves the reasoning of Chis-
holm as it was. As such, it must be judged on its merits. If it was 
wrongly decided, the Eleventh Amendment adds little, if any, sup-
port for that conclusion. 
Nor am I claiming in this Essay that the Court in Chisholm was 
correct in its conception of popular sovereignty as belonging to the 
people as individuals and not to the state or state governments, ei-
ther as a matter of constitutional theory or of history. Of course, 
my sympathies on this subject should be obvious. That Chisholm 
 
79 See Manning, supra note 52, at 1749 (“[O]ne cannot disregard the selective inclu-
sion and exclusion implicit in such careful specification . . . [and] should perhaps at-
tach significance not only to what the drafters placed in the Amendment, but also to 
what they deemed necessary or even prudent to exclude.”). 
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was decided so close to the enactment of the Constitution—in 
sharp contrast to the Court’s decision in Hans one hundred years 
later—and that the individualist concept of popular sovereignty 
was affirmed by the eminences of James Wilson and John Jay is 
powerful evidence that “the People” to which the Constitution re-
fers was indeed an individualist concept. At a minimum, it is 
plainly not anachronistic to attribute so individualist a sense of 
sovereignty to the era. 
The proposition that “joint sovereignty” resides in the individu-
als who comprise the people is also textually supported by the 
wording of the Tenth Amendment, which confirms that all powers 
not delegated to the general government by the Constitution are 
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people. If at least some 
of the “other” rights retained by the people to which the Ninth 
Amendment refers belong to individuals, as I believe the evidence 
shows,80 it would be exceedingly odd if “the People” to which the 
Tenth Amendment refers are not also individuals. And “the Peo-
ple” is explicitly distinguished from “the states.” I confess that I am 
beginning to suspect that the purely collective reading of “the Peo-
ple” by Professor Akhil Amar and others may well be anachronis-
tic, but to establish this proposition would require more investiga-
tion into the historical sources than I have yet to attempt. 
My only claim with respect to the Eleventh Amendment is that it 
did not displace the individualist concept of the people affirmed by 
the Court, whether rightly or wrongly, in Chisholm. And, unlike 
the Ninth Amendment, which makes no sense whatsoever without 
presupposing the existence of the very unenumerated rights to 
which it refers, the Eleventh Amendment makes perfect sense 
whether or not you assume the existence of state sovereignty. It 
can fairly be read as carving out of federal jurisdiction suits 
brought by two types of parties, an alteration in the jurisdiction af-
forded by Article III that required a change in the original Consti-
tution to accomplish. At a minimum, the conclusion that Chis-
holm’s individualist concept of sovereignty was not repudiated by 
the Eleventh Amendment justifies including this concept among 
 
80 See Randy E. Barnett, The Ninth Amendment: It Means What It Says, 85 Tex. L. 
Rev. 1 (2006). 
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the contenders for how popular sovereignty was conceived at the 
time of the founding. 
But putting aside the Eleventh Amendment, the really interest-
ing challenge posed by Chisholm is its individualist theory of popu-
lar sovereignty: what does it mean to say that the people are “joint 
sovereigns”? This brings me to a final reason why Chisholm is not 
among the canon of constitutional law cases of which all learned 
lawyers must be aware. Chisholm may be ignored for the very 
same reason that the Ninth Amendment is ignored: it is simply too 
radical. Indeed, the individualist popular sovereignty affirmed in 
Chisholm is the opposite side of the very same coin as the “other” 
individual rights retained by the people, as affirmed by the Ninth 
Amendment.81 It may well be that the concept of sovereignty af-
firmed in Chisholm, the original meaning of the Ninth Amend-
ment, and the original meaning of the Privileges or Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment are all ignored by the Court 
because the implications of taking them seriously are so momen-
tous. And law professors tend to internalize the Supreme Court’s 
boundaries on respectable legal argument (and vice versa). 
If nothing else, Chisholm teaches that the concept of sovereignty 
as residing in the body of the people, as individuals, was alive at the 
time of the founding and well enough to be adopted by two Jus-
tices of the Supreme Court, who were also influential Founders. 
Likewise, Chisholm shows that the bold assertion that states inher-
ited the power of kings (subject only to express constitutional con-
straints) was rejected by four of five Justices when the issue first 
arose. By omitting Chisholm v. Georgia, the first great constitu-
tional case, from the canon of constitutional law, we have turned 
our gaze away from perhaps the most fundamental question of 
constitutional theory and the radical way it was once answered by 
the Supreme Court. We law professors have hidden all this from 
our students; and by hiding it from our students, we have hidden it 
from ourselves. 
 
81 See id. (affirming the individual natural rights model of the Ninth Amendment). 
